

# Opposing Forces? Intergenerational Social Mobility and the Transmission of Political Ideology

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*Abstract:* This study investigates the consequences of intergenerational social mobility for the transmission of political ideology from parents to adult children, taking the parental ideology explicitly into account. Analyses using German and Swiss household data show that especially the vertically upwardly mobile are less influenced by the parental ideology. However, longitudinal analyses do not indicate causal effects, but a self-selection mechanism into social mobility. These findings have consequences for the perception of social mobility effects.

Keywords: political socialization, social mobility, intergenerational transmission

# Forces contraires ? Mobilité sociale intergénérationnelle et transmission idéologique

*Résumé*: Cet article étudie les conséquences de la mobilité sociale intergénérationnelle sur la transmission de l'idéologie politique des parents à leurs enfants adultes, en considérant l'idéologie des parentales de manière explicite. L'analyse des données de foyers allemands et suisses révèle que les individus qui connaissent une mobilité ascendante sont moins influencés par l'idéologie de leurs parents. Cependant, les analyses longitudinales n'établissent pas d'effet de causalité, mais plutôt un mécanisme d'auto-sélection vers la mobilité sociale.

Mots-clés : socialisation politique, mobilité sociale, transmission intergénérationnelle

# Entgegengesetzte Dynamiken? Intergenerationelle soziale Mobilität und die Übertragung politischer Ideologie

Zusammenfassung: Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Folgen der intergenerationellen sozialen Mobilität für die Übertragung der politischen Ideologie von Eltern (explizit berücksichtigt) auf ihre erwachsenen Kinder. Analysen deutscher und schweizerischer Haushaltsdaten zeigen, dass vor allem Personen, die in der vertikalen sozialen Hierarchie aufsteigen, weniger von der elterlichen Ideologie beeinflusst werden. Längsschnittanalysen deuten jedoch nicht auf kausale Effekte, sondern auf eine Selektion in die soziale Mobilität als Erklärung hin.

Schlüsselwörter: politische Sozialisation, soziale Mobilität, intergenerationale Übertragung

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### 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The study of intergenerational social mobility is imperative to the social sciences, as it has important implications for the equality of opportunities in society. Connected to the study of class voting, the political consequences of social mobility have been studied by investigating the importance of the class of origin for political preferences and ideology of socially mobile voters, compared to the socially immobile (e.g. Turner 1992; De Graaf et al. 1995). However, political preferences of parents are left out of the equation here. As a result, not much is known about the consequences of social mobility for political socialization processes in families, whereas early socialization in the class of origin is a key mechanism in the relation between class location and political preferences.

Therefore, this study investigates the consequences of intergenerational social mobility for the transmission of political ideology from parents to their adult children. In other words: what happens to the intergenerational transmission of political ideology, when there is no transmission of class location? As social status inheritance is an important driver of intergenerational attitude transmission, social mobility can be expected to disrupt this process. Socially mobile citizens are compared to the immobile in the extent to which their political ideology is predicted by the ideology of their parents. Both vertical and horizontal social mobility are considered. Whereas vertical mobility is about the *status* of a given profession or class location, horizontal mobility regards the *field* of the profession, implying distinct work logics (Oesch 2006). Individuals' experiences under different work logics are expected to play an important role in shaping one's view of society, as recent research has shown that horizontal differentiation by work logic has implications for political preferences and ideology (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Thus, whereas the vertical class location is connected to political preferences in the traditional class voting perspective, the horizontal class location is a newer conception of the relationship between the work logic and political preferences. As they are jointly under study here, it can be disentangled which type of social mobility matters more for the intergenerational transmission of political ideology.

I expect that horizontal and vertical social mobility reduce the long-term political socialization process, and that the political ideology of socially mobile adult children is thus less close to their parents' ideology compared to those who remain immobile (i. e. end up in the same class location as their parents). These expectations are tested using Swiss (1999-2017) and German (2005, 2009) household studies, by jointly analysing the parental ideology and their offspring's social mobility and political ideology. To control for self-selection into social mobility, individual fixed

<sup>1</sup> This study has been realized using the data collected by the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). SOEP is published by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. SHP is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS. The project is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF).

effects (FE) analysis is performed on the Swiss data, to model changes in individuals' political ideology and class location over time. This analysis can show whether the findings of the first analyses are due to causal effects, or rather to a self-selection mechanism.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, the concepts of social mobility and the class scheme are described. Then, different mechanisms are presented as to how intergenerational social mobility is expected to impede the transmission of political ideology. Subsequently, the research design is discussed, and the results of the analyses are presented. Finally, I conclude that especially upward vertical social mobility shows a smaller transmission of political ideology from parent to offspring. However, longitudinal analyses show that this effect is not causal, as the adult child does not change their political ideology *after* the change in class location, rather pointing at self-selection into social mobility. Results regarding other types of mobility differ between the two countries under study. Limited evidence is found for a causal effect for one type of horizontal mobility in Switzerland, which underlines the importance of additional research regarding the connection between work logic and political preferences.

# 2 Vertical and horizontal intergenerational social mobility

#### 2.1 The Oesch class scheme and ideological alignment by class location

This study makes use of the Oesch (2006) class scheme, as it takes recent changes in the social and occupational structure into account. It is composed of a vertical hierarchy reflecting occupational skill requirements and employment relationships, and horizontal differentiation by type of work logic. Most previous studies regarding class voting and social mobility use the Erikson-Goldthorpe class scheme (Erikson et al. 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). This class scheme consists of up to 11 categories, ranging from higher-grade professionals to agricultural workers, and reflects mainly one dimension. Its aim is to represent the main occupational and class divisions of most Western industrial post-WWII societies, by differentiating positions within labour markets and production units in terms of their employment relationships (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, 37).

Oesch argues that due to increased female labour participation; the increased importance of the service sector; and increased levels of education, the salience of the divide between manual and non-manual labour has decreased, which asks for additional horizontal differentiation *within* the middle class (2006, 25). Therefore, he proposes a new class scheme that more adequately reflects the social stratification in contemporary Western Europe. The full class scheme consists of 16 categories.

### Table 1 Oesch class scheme (8 classes) with representative occupations, and place of the middle classes within the left–right spectrum.

Centre	Centre-right	
Technical work logic	Organizational work logic	Entrepreneurial work logic
Midd	le class	
Technical (semi-) professionals	(Associate) Managers	Large employers and self- employed professionals
[5.3/4.7]	[5.9/5.3]	[6.4/5.5]
engineers, architects, safety inspectors, computing professionals	public/business adminis- trators, financial managers, tax officials	firm owners, lawyers, accountants
Worki	ng class	
Production workers [4.9/5]	Office Clerks [5.3/4.8]	Small business owners ( $\leq$ 9/ no employees) [6.4/6.2]
carpenters, assemblers, machinists, gardeners	secretaries, call centre employees, stock clerks	shop-owners, hair- dressers, farmers
	Centre Technical work logic Midd Technical (semi-) professionals [5.3 / 4.7] engineers, architects, safety inspectors, computing professionals Worki Production workers [4.9 / 5] carpenters, assemblers, machinists, gardeners	CentreCentre-rightTechnicalOrganizationalwork logicwork logicMiddle classTechnical (semi-)(Associate) Managersprofessionals[5.9/5.3][5.3/4.7][5.9/5.3]engineers, architects, safety inspectors, computing professionalspublic/business adminis- trators, computing professionalsEngineers, architects, safety inspectors, computing professionalspublic/business adminis- trators, 

#### Source: Oesch (2008).

Father's mean left-right position by class location between brackets, based on author's calculations using respectively SHP 1999–2017 and G-SOEP 2005, 2009.

Similar to previous studies (Oesch 2008; Oesch and Rennwald 2010), this research uses the simplified 8-category version, as depicted in Table 1.

Subsequent studies have shown that horizontal distinctions are vital for the study of political preferences and its connection with class location, as they reveal differences in political preferences within wage-earners of the middle classes in Europe (excluding the self-employed) (Oesch 2008; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). This ideological alignment is explained either by self-selection; or socialization in the work logic: "it is the occupational experience itself that nurtures and reinforces political attitudes" (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, 9-10). The vast differences in the day-to-day work setting are thus expected to translate into a different vision of society and corresponding political priorities. As such, managers are expected to be less in favour of economic redistribution compared to socio-cultural professionals and technical professionals. In terms of cultural preferences, socio-cultural professionals are the most liberal, followed by technical professionals, while managers hold the least libertarian views (Oesch 2008; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Recent work shows socio-cultural professionals standing very close to production workers in terms of state-market preferences, and that the middle classes are heterogeneous in their positions on the economic dimension (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015).

Translating this to the left–right ideological spectrum, associate managers have centre-right political ideologies, technical professionals are found around the centre, and socio-cultural professionals are centre-left, whereas the political ideology of all three working classes are found mostly around the centre to the left on the left–right scale (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, 12). Table 1 also depicts this classification, together with father's mean left-right positions by class position, as calculated using the datasets employed in this study. While Kitschelt and Rehm's classification by ideology does not include the entrepreneurial (or independent) work logic, the data analysed here does show distinct differences by left-right ideology for these classes, especially the small business owners.

# 2.2 Vertical and horizontal intergenerational social mobility

Social mobility refers to the movement of individuals across social strata in society. Therefore, *intergenerational* social mobility implies having a different class location than one's parents, at the time the offspring has arrived at its own class of destination. Young children inevitably have the same class location as their parents. Using the Oesch class scheme, two different types of intergenerational social mobility can be investigated. First, vertical mobility is reached when the adult child ends up in one of the middle classes while the parent is from one of the working classes (upward vertical social mobility), or vice versa, when the child finds itself in one of the working classes whereas the parent is located in one of the middle classes (downward vertical social mobility). Second, horizontal mobility implies not working under the same work logic as the parent, and is operationalized in the following way: an adult child may have moved away from their parent's 1) interpersonal; 2) technical; 3) organizational; or 4) entrepreneurial work logic. The different categories thus represent the parent's work logic and the fact that their offspring is working in a different one. When an adult child has the same class location as the parent, this is regarded as immobile, and can apply to both horizontal and vertical mobility separately.

As the horizontally classified work logic and vertical class location are overlapping in this two-dimensional class scheme, it is possible to experience both vertical and horizontal mobility simultaneously. For instance, the child of an office clerk who becomes a socio-cultural professional experiences vertical mobility (upward, from working to middle class), and horizontal mobility compared to the parent's class location (as the parent worked in the organizational work logic, whereas the adult child works in the interpersonal logic). In this study, vertical and horizontal mobility are also studied separately in order not to conflate different mobility effects, by investigating individuals from middle- and working-class origins not only together but also independently from each other.

### 3 Political socialization and intergenerational social mobility

Political socialization theory identifies next to social or political learning (Bandura 1977; Jennings and Niemi 1968), the inheritance of structural factors like social class (Glass et al. 1986) as a key mechanism behind the intergenerational transmission of political preferences. Therefore, research on class transmission is crucial to political socialization research, and strongly connected to studies in class voting and social mobility. Social mobility is a key-mediating factor in the structural inheritance mechanism. When children move away from their parental social class, this means a disruption of this mechanism. It could therefore be argued that those who have become socially mobile vis-à-vis their parents are less likely to take over the political preferences of their parents, because they did not inherit their parental social class in the long run.

Since the beginning of the study of voting behaviour, structural factors such as social class form an important political cleavage in most post-industrial societies (Lipset 1960; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Evans 1993). During later years, class voting became a much-debated topic and a body of literature emerged that announced the waning influence of social class on political choice and attitudes (Franklin et al. 1992; Clark et al. 1993; for an overview see Manza et al. 1995). Not all scholars agreed on the existence of this decline, and argue it is simply a *different type* of class divide in politics (Evans 2000; Oesch 2008). However, other studies continue to show the decline in class voting (Knutsen 2006; Van der Brug 2010; Jansen et al. 2013).

A number of studies has investigated the relationship between social mobility and political attitudes and voting behaviour (e.g. Turner 1992; Clifford and Heath 1993; De Graaf et al. 1995; Benabou and Ok 2001; Clark and D'Angelo 2013). Although the findings are not uniform, the main conclusions are in line with the *acculturation hypothesis*, describing a process of (partial) adaptation to the class of destination (De Graaf et al. 1995). The political preferences of socially mobile citizens are found somewhere between the class of origin and the class of destination, and the longer one spends in the class of destination, the more the impact of the class of origin diminishes (Knutsen 2006, 1–2). Most of these studies are undertaken with data from before the 1990s and are mostly limited to the US, the UK, and The Netherlands. Additionally, most of them only take the social mobility of males into account, and they practically all make use of the Erikson–Goldthorpe class scheme. The present study updates these findings by using more recent data from two European multi-party systems, Germany and Switzerland, including males and females, and making use of the more recent Oesch class scheme.

Most importantly, previous research does not observe the political preferences of the parents, and therefore does not allow studying the actual transmission mechanism. As social mobility breaks with social status inheritance, a key mechanism in political socialization processes (Glass et al. 1986), it has several implications for the possibility of intergenerational political preference transmission. This study focuses on the transmission of political *ideology*, since in multi-party systems – as the two countries under study here – it is most often ideology rather than partisan attachment that is transmitted, due to a multitude of political parties (Westholm and Niemi 1992; Ventura 2001). I identify three mechanisms as to how intergenerational social mobility may impede the transmission of political ideology from parents to children.

The first mechanism applies to vertical mobility only: experiencing a different socioeconomic status in society most often leads to different economic interests. Traditional rational choice and class voting theory predict that these different interests translate into different political preferences (Downs 1957; Evans 1993). An adult child who has a different vertical class location than the parents will therefore be not likely to take over the political ideology of the parents in the long run. This mechanism is specifically expected to operate for those experiencing *upward* social mobility, as their economic prospects are better compared to those of their parents. Contrarily, downwardly mobile individuals are more expected to keep identifying with (the interests of) their class of origin, as they are most likely less satisfied with the experienced mobility than the upwardly mobile. Indeed, a feeling of frustration is found among the downwardly mobile (Peugny 2006).

Second, a less structural mechanism refers to socially mobile persons having different kinship relations, and therefore applies to both vertical and horizontal mobility. Socially mobile individuals have more segmented primary social relation groups, which results in having different kinship relationships and spending leisure time rather with individuals in their destination class (Goldthorpe 1986, 160–70). This is expected to reduce the political influence of kin and to increase the level of re-socialization by new peers in their destination class (Jackman 1972; Peugny 2006), resulting in a less enduring influence of the early political socialization in the family.

A third mechanism specifically applies to horizontal mobility, and the relationship between the work logic and political ideology. Horizontal intergenerational social mobility implies the offspring is working under a different work logic than the parent. The setting of the work process and the relations of authority are therefore different, just as the sector of the occupation. As described earlier, the differences in the day-to-day work can easily translate to contrasting visions of society, with associated distinct political preferences (Oesch 2008; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Being re-socialized under a work logic that differs from that of the parent is expected to reduce the parent–child transmission of ideology in the long run. This expectation is mostly directed to those of middle-class origins, as only this group shows differences regarding political ideology by work logic (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014).

Based on the above considerations, the following hypotheses are put forward: H1a. The political ideology of upwardly vertically mobile individuals is less close

to the parental political ideology, compared to the socially immobile.

- H1b. The political ideology of downwardly vertically mobile individuals is equally close to the parental political ideology, compared to the socially immobile.
- H2. The political ideology of horizontally mobile individuals, especially those with middle-class origins, is less close to the parental political ideology, compared to the socially immobile.

Lastly, an additional and crucial mechanism is individuals' self-selection into intergenerational social mobility. This mechanism is explicitly tested by individual fixed effects analysis (see section 4.3 Model Strategy). Self-selection into social mobility implies that people who become socially mobile are *from the outset different* from people who do not become socially mobile. Hence, they are not different *as a causal consequence of* their experience of social mobility. In that case, any differences between the mobile and immobile are not due to the experience of mobility *per se*, but to the fact that the mobile individuals were already different *before* they underwent social mobility, which may be the reason they have become mobile in the first place. For instance, the experience of a very intelligent child with working class origins who receives different education than their parents from a young age onwards, could already result in vastly different interests and preferences from their parents' social milieu, and eventually lead to vertical mobility. A similar reasoning can be put forward regarding horizontal mobility, i. e. the child choosing to work under a different work logic than the parent, because this is a better fit with the child's preferences and abilities.

H3. The larger ideological distance between parents and their socially mobile offspring, compared to the socially immobile, is at least partially due to the individual's self-selection into social mobility.

### 4 Research design

# 4.1 Analytic sample and operationalization

Respondents are included in this analysis from age 30 years onwards, a common practice in social mobility research (e.g. Peugny 2006; Falcon 2013). This reduces the risk that the respondent has not yet obtained their highest level of education, or has not yet found the (full-time) employment that indicates their eventual class of destination. Respondents enrolled in education at time of the survey are excluded. In contrast to previous social mobility studies, this study includes both males and females.

To measure social mobility, class locations of respondents are compared with their class of origin, as indicated by the father's class location when the child was young (Clifford and Heath 1993; De Graaf et al. 1995; Breen 2004). This choice is based on the empirical fact that most fathers were the breadwinner in the childhood households of the generations under study here.<sup>2</sup> Relatedly, father's ideology is used as a *proxy* for parental ideology, for two reasons. Firstly, because of the usage of the father's class location and the relation between class location and political ideology that the hypotheses build upon, the father's ideology is the most intuitive choice for investigating the political ideology transmission that is partially based on the inheritance of structural factors. Similarly, the mother's political ideology is likely to relate to the father's ideology (Beck and Jennings 1975; Zuckerman et al. 2007) and his class location.

### 4.2 Data and variables

Data is used from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP, 1999–2017) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (G-SOEP, 2005 and 2009) surveys, using all waves that include political ideology of parents and adult children.

The dependent variable political ideology is operationalized as left–right selfplacement, measured on an 11-point scale (0 to 10). The key independent variables are intergenerational social mobility and the father's political ideology (G-SOEP, direct observations of the father's left-right self-placement; SHP, retrospective variable:<sup>3</sup> "And when you were about 15 years old, where did your father stand politically, if 0 means 'left-wing' and 10 means 'right-wing'?"). As both datasets contain the left-right position of parents and offspring, this allows for direct comparison of their ideological positions, which is crucial for the purpose of this study. Left-right self-placement is a summarizing concept of individuals' political ideology that is the most widely used short-hand term in political science (Mair 2007). While indices of individuals' positions on various policy preferences provide a more fine-grained and less abstract measure of political ideology, the advantage of the use of the leftright scale is that its meaning adapts to salient issues and dimensions in politics over time, such as the increased importance of socio-cultural issues (Lachat 2018).

The class location of respondents and their father (when the respondent was 15 years old, retrospectively provided), are based on the occupation measured by

<sup>2</sup> The relatively low female labour force participation (CH: 35%, DE: 50%) and the domination of part-time work by women (CH: 80%, DE: 90%), during the 1980s – when the youngest respondents in this study were born – are strong indicators of the male breadwinner model (FSO 2010; OECD 2017; stats.oecd.org).

<sup>3</sup> Research shows that this second-hand information is reliable: it strongly correlates with direct observations of the parental ideology during the panel (Pearson's R = 0.6, p<0.00), available for 14% of respondents; and it leads to the same average position as the direct observations (Wernli 2010, 25). Moreover, author's calculations indicate that respondents are more likely to place themselves on the midpoint of the scale (30%) than their father (25%); and 28% of respondents of below average political interest place their father on the midpoint, compared to 23% of respondents on or above average political interest. This shows that also less politically interested respondents are able to place their father on the left-right scale, and do not use the mid-point as a default answer. Percentages of respondents' left-right self-placement by the retrospective positioning of their father are provided in the Appendix, Table A1.</p>

4-digit ISCO-88 codes. These occupations are recoded<sup>4</sup> into the 8-class Oesch scheme. Social mobility is operationalized by two categorical variables. Vertical mobility can take the values immobile, upwardly mobile, and downwardly mobile, which implies having either a similar, lower, or higher vertical class location compared to the father. Horizontal mobility can take the values immobile, and four subsequent categories for four types of horizontal mobility: having moved away from the father's entrepreneurial, organizational, technical, or interpersonal work logic, implying that the child works under a different work logic than the father.

Control variables are included for civil status (married, divorced/separated, other), level of education (low, medium, high)<sup>5</sup>, gender, and age. For Germany, respondents' location in 1989 is included (East or West Germany, or abroad).

# 4.3 Model strategy

### 4.3.1 Regression analysis using G-SOEP and SHP

First, cross-sectional OLS regression analysis is performed with standard errors clustered at the household level. The G-SOEP data is pooled without overlap using the 2009 observations as baseline. Of the SHP data, the most recent wave for each respondent is used. The child's left–right ideology is regressed on the father's left–right ideology and class of origin. In subsequent models, horizontal and vertical mobility are added. To test hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the differential impact of the parental ideology by vertical and horizontal mobility, both types of mobility are interacted with father's ideology (mean-centred). To adequately test hypothesis 2, which is mostly directed to individuals with middle-class origins, models are also estimated for those respondents separately.

### 4.3.2 Individual fixed effects analysis using SHP

To test hypothesis 3 (self-selection mechanism), individual fixed effect (FE) models are estimated using longitudinal SHP data (1999–2017). Respondents' left–right ideology is analysed over time in relation to their change in class location, compared to the father's. To estimate this "within-persons" analysis properly, an additional category for social mobility is added: a 0-category for when the child has not arrived in the class of destination yet, i. e. before the age of 30.<sup>6</sup> As such, this analysis can

<sup>4</sup> Recoding scheme of Daniel Oesch, available through http://people.unil.ch/danieloesch/scripts/ (scripts for G-SOEP and SHP dated respectively July 2015 and February 2011, downloaded respectively March 2016 and May 2016).

<sup>5</sup> All OLS models are also estimated without controlling for education, as one could argue that this is partially controlling the effect of social mobility away, as social mobility is often achieved through education. However, education is included in the presented models in order to isolate the mobility effect from a potential education effect. The results of the models without controlling for education are similar: the relevant coefficients are a bit larger, but do not differ importantly in size nor in statistical significance and therefore do not lead to any different conclusions.

<sup>6</sup> Without including this additional 0-category, the analysis would be limited to only those socially mobile individuals who experienced both inter- and intragenerational mobility.

capture a change in the respondent's left–right ideology before and after arriving in the class of destination, differentiating between immobile and mobile respondents.<sup>7</sup> This analysis addresses the question whether individuals change their ideology *after* having become socially mobile, pointing either to a causal effect of social mobility on ideology, or a self-selection mechanism into social mobility.

# 5 Results

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# 5.1 Descriptive results

Before testing the hypotheses, descriptive analyses are presented. Table 2 (Switzerland) and Table 3 (Germany) show contingency tables of respondents' class of destination by father's class location (class of origin). Class locations are grouped by work logic (respectively entrepreneurial, technical, organizational, and interpersonal). Cells on the diagonal represent the percentage of horizontally *and* vertically immobile respondents, i. e. with the *same* class location as the father. Cells highlighted in grey represent *horizontally immobile* individuals, percentages in bold represent *vertically immobile* individuals. All other cells represent individuals with a *different* class location than the father, indicating respectively horizontal (*not* highlighted in grey), vertical (percentage *not* in bold), or both types of social mobility (not highlighted and not in bold).

The patterns in both tables are similar. The highest percentage of class reproduction is formed by production workers, of which 46% (Switzerland) and 65% (Germany) have a father who was also a production worker. The lowest reproduction rates are in the interpersonal work logic (12 to 3%), due to the expansion of the service sector and decline of manual workers. Therefore, a large percentage of service workers have a father who was a production worker (respectively 42% and 61%). Another common horizontal move: clerks with fathers who were production workers. A frequent vertical move is technical (semi-)professionals with fathers who were production workers. Lastly, a large share of managers and socio-cultural (semi-)professionals has a father who was a production worker, a combination of horizontal and vertical upward mobility. These findings show that there is both vertical and horizontal social mobility across generations in Germany and Switzerland, with somewhat larger class reproduction and thus smaller mobility levels in Germany.

Person-years are left out of the analysis in which individuals made an additional transition, i.e. going back from socially mobile to immobile.

Father's class location				Respond	ent's class	location			
	Large emply.	Small busin.	Techn. prof.	Prod. work.	Manag.	Clerks	Socio- cult pr.	Service work.	Total
Large emply.	7.3	4.1	2.8	1.5	3.3	3.7	4.1	2.2	3.4
Small busin.	16.8	32.8	15.9	28.3	17.6	18.4	15.5	25.7	21.3
Technical prof.	10.9	6.9	13.0	4.5	9.4	6.3	11.7	5.1	8.3
Prod. workers	25.5	30.2	33.2	45.5	31.2	37.1	25.2	42.0	34.0
Managers	22.0	13.7	16.5	7.6	20.2	16.1	19.0	10.6	15.7
Clerks	5.9	5.0	6.4	5.4	7.5	9.0	7.8	6.4	6.9
Socio-cult. prof.	8.5	3.9	6.4	2.2	6.0	3.1	12.3	3.6	5.8
Service workers	3.2	3.5	5.8	5.1	4.8	6.2	4.4	4.4	4.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

# Table 2Percentages of respondents by own and father's class location,<br/>Switzerland

Source: SHP 1999–2017. N = 12,825.

Cells highlighted in grey represent *horizontally immobile* individuals, percentages in bold represent *vertically immobile* individuals.

# Table 3Percentages of respondents by own and father's class location,<br/>Germany

Father's class location Respondent's class location									
	Large emply.	Small busin.	Techn. prof.	Prod. work.	Manag.	Clerks	Socio- cult pr.	Service work.	Total
Large emply.	11.3	4.9	2.6	0.8	2.4	1.0	3.8	0.8	2.6
Small busin.	6.9	11.2	6.5	6.3	6.2	7.6	6.8	6.4	6.9
Technical prof.	14.1	10.6	17.1	4.3	13.8	8.9	13.1	5.6	10.6
Prod. workers	22.3	38.5	39.0	65.4	37.0	47.2	34.5	61.0	45.4
Managers	19.9	16.3	15.1	7.6	20.1	13.6	17.3	8.6	14.5
Clerks	6.9	5.5	7.8	4.9	8.9	8.2	8.3	5.2	7.1
Socio-cult. prof.	13.1	5.1	6.7	1.5	5.5	4.6	10.6	2.7	5.6
Service workers	5.5	8.0	5.3	9.2	6.1	9.0	5.7	9.8	7.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: G-SOEP 2009. N = 6,050.

Cells highlighted in grey represent *horizontally immobile* individuals, percentages in bold represent *vertically immobile* individuals.

# 5.2 OLS analyses for Switzerland and Germany

The first OLS models are presented in Table 4.<sup>8</sup> Model 1 shows that father's ideology predicts adult child's ideology (b is respectively 0.25 and 0.21), also when controlling for father's class location. These results indicate that the parental socialization does not only run through the inheritance of structural factors, indicating social and political learning as another driver of intergenerational attitude transmission. In model 2, social mobility of the child is added. Whereas in Germany only a few mobility effects are found, in Switzerland there are many.

	cial mobility			
Left-right self-placement	Switzerla	ind	Germany	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Father's L/R ideology	0.248***	0.246***	0.211***	0.211***
	(0.0113)	(0.0113)	(0.0521)	(0.0513)
Vertical Mobility				
(ref=no mobility)				
Downward		0.215**		-0.0942
		(0.0870)		(0.242)
Upward		-0.330***		-0.320*
		(0.0646)		(0.177)
Horizontal Mobility (ref = no mobility)				
Move from Entrepreneurial		-0.321***		-0.714
		(0.111)		(0.724)
Move from Organizational		-0.476***		0.0365
Ū		(0.0932)		(0.268)
Move from Technical		0.112		0.345**
		(0.0936)		(0.174)
Move from Interpersonal		0.299**		0.231
		(0.133)		(0.348)
Father's class location	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Controls	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Year of interview dummies	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		
Constant	5.245***	5.235***	4.856***	5.292***
	(0.705)	(0.646)	(0.649)	(0.691)
Observations	7685	7685	770	770
R-squared	0.135	0.143	0.088	0.099

# Table 4OLS regressions of child's ideology on father's ideology<br/>and social mobility

Source: SHP 1999–2017; G-SOEP 2005 and 2009. SEs in parentheses, clustered at the household. \*\*\*  $p\!<\!0.01,$  \*\*  $p\!<\!0.05,$  \*  $p\!<\!0.1$ 

8 Full models are available in the Appendix, Table A2.

In both countries, upwardly mobile individuals take more leftist positions compared to the immobile: a difference of about one-third point on the left-right scale. In Switzerland, downwardly mobile respondents take more rightist positions (b = 0.22), similar to the horizontally mobile who moved away from the father's interpersonal work logic (b = 0.30). On the other hand, those who have moved away from the father's entrepreneurial (-0.32) or organizational work logic (-0.48), take more leftist positions than the immobile. In Germany, the only horizontal mobility effect is found for offspring of fathers from the technical logic (b = 0.35). These findings imply that socially mobile individuals are different from the immobile, most likely a combination of mobility and class of origin effects.

To test whether the impact of father's ideology on offspring's ideology differs by the experience of social mobility (H1 and H2), interaction effects are modelled between social mobility and father's ideology.<sup>9</sup> The relevant comparison is thus between the coefficients of the father's ideology by different categories of social mobility. Firstly, father's ideology is interacted with vertical mobility. The calculated marginal effects are presented in Figure 1. The results indicate support for hypothesis 1a in both countries with statistically significant negative interaction effects: a smaller ideological transmission is found among the upwardly mobile, compared to the immobile. In Switzerland, upwardly mobile adults are statistically significant (p < 0.05) less influenced by their father's ideology than immobile adults, with a difference of .06 (respective marginal effects of 0.27 and 0.21). In line with hypothesis 1b, there are no differences between the downwardly mobile and the immobile. In Germany, differences are larger and found for both types of vertical mobility, which supports hypothesis 1a but not hypothesis 1b. Immobile individuals are influenced by their father's ideology with a coefficient of 0.33, while for the upwardly and downwardly mobile this drops to non-statistically significant effects (respectively 0.048 (p = 0.82) and 0.028 (p = 0.56)).

Subsequently, horizontal mobility is interacted with father's left-right ideology, showing no statistically significant interaction terms in both countries. This implies that the horizontally mobile and immobile are equally influenced by their father's ideology, contrary to H2. As this hypothesis is more specifically directed to individuals with middle class origins, this interaction model is also estimated limited to those respondents, but only for Switzerland as the German subsample contains too few observations (N = 306) for reliable results using a 5-category interaction. Figure 2 presents the calculated marginal effects of the interaction models using the whole German sample, and the Swiss sample limited to middle class origins. In Switzerland, one significant positive interaction effect (p = 0.09) is observed: middle class-origin respondents who moved away from their father's interpersonal work logic (i. e. socio-cultural professionals), are *closer* to the parental ideology than the

<sup>9</sup> For sake of parsimony, Figure 1 and 2 present the marginal effects from these interactions. The full OLS model coefficients are available in the Appendix, Table A3.



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009 (N: 770); SHP 1999–2017 (N: 7.685). Marginal effects calculated on the basis of regression model 3 in Table A3.

# Figure 2 Marginal effects of father's ideology on child's ideology, by horizontal mobility (interaction)



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009 (N: 770, full sample); SHP 1999–2017 (N: 2,842, middle class only). Marginal effects calculated on the basis of regression models 4 (DE) and 5 (CH) in Table A3.

immobile. The difference in coefficient is 0.1 (marginal effect of 0.35, compared to 0.25 for the immobile). This reflects the strong ideological alignment of the sociocultural professionals, which is robustly transmitted to their offspring.

In short, the results indicate support for hypothesis 1. In line with H1a, upwardly mobile individuals are less influenced by the father's ideology in both countries. In Germany, a similar effect is also found for the downwardly mobile, whereas in Switzerland – as expected in H1b – this is not the case. H2 is not supported by the findings, as horizontally mobile groups are most often equally influenced by the father's ideology as the immobile. An exception is the offspring of socio-cultural professionals in Switzerland, as they are closer to the father's ideology.

# 5.3 Individual fixed effect analysis for Switzerland

What the foregoing analyses have not been able to address, is to what extent socially mobile people have different political preferences (compared to their parents) *from the outset*, or whether the fact that they have become socially mobile has caused them to change their ideology over time, making them move away from the father's ideology. Put simply: are the previous findings for the upwardly mobile due to self-selection into social mobility, or is there a causal effect?

The individual FE analysis shows to what extent individuals' ideology changes over time, after becoming socially mobile. As before, the dependent variable is the ideology of the adult child, but in these analyses this is also indicative of the distance to the father's ideology. As the father's ideology is observed at one specific point in time and all time-invariant observations will drop out of the FE analysis, and observations for all respondents over time are de-meaned (Allison 2009, 19), it does not make a difference whether to look at the child's *ideology* or the child's *distance to the father's ideology* in this analysis.

Table 5 presents the results, i. e. the effects of social mobility on ideology *within* individuals over time. Model 1 shows no significant effects of downward or upward vertical social mobility on left–right ideology. These findings imply that the previously found larger difference in ideology between upwardly mobile children and their father, compared to those who are immobile, is not due to a *change* in the ideology of the children after experiencing social mobility, but most likely to self-selection into social mobility. Rather than a causal effect, it is the result of an earlier process, which may have led to the child becoming upwardly mobile. These findings support hypothesis 3.

For horizontal mobility (model 2), the results indicate that horizontally mobile individuals who moved away from the father's interpersonal work logic move towards the right on the left–right scale, as indicated by positive effects (in line with previous OLS results). This implies that these individuals have moved away from their fathers' centre-left positions after experiencing horizontal mobility. Findings are similar when separating respondents from working and middle-class origins

Left–right self-placement	(1)	(2)
Vertical Mobility (ref = no mobility)		
No class location yet	0.000709	
	(0.0354)	
Downward	-0.0194	
	(0.0406)	
Upward	-0.00305	
	(0.0299)	
Horizontal Mobility (ref = no mobility)		
No class location yet		0.0404
		(0.0385)
Move from Entrepreneurial		-0.0266
·		(0.0431)
Move from Organizational		0.0258
		(0.0448)
Move from Technical		0.0657
		(0.0409)
Move from Interpersonal		0.190***
		(0.0647)
Age in year of interview	0.0177***	0.0177***
	(0.00109)	(0.00109)
Constant	3.915***	3.880***
	(0.0574)	(0.0594)
N person-years	62 59 1	62 591
N individuals	8820	8820
R-squared	0.005	0.005

# Table 5 Individual fixed effects analysis: left–right Ideology on intergenerational social mobility, Switzerland

Source: SHP 1999–2017. SEs in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

(Appendix Table A4, model 3 and 4), but with a larger effect size among the working class (respectively 0.28 and 0.14). A model including both types of mobility jointly for all respondents (Table A4, model 5), does not lead to any different conclusions.

These results indicate that horizontally mobile offspring of fathers who are sociocultural professionals and service workers are the only groups that show a change in ideology after experiencing social mobility. Combining this with the previous finding that offspring of socio-cultural professionals stand *closer* to the father's ideology, it most likely implies that this group was even more strongly influenced by their parents to start with (which we do not observe here). Then, due to the mobility they moved a bit away, but compared to the immobile they still have ideological positions closer to that of their parents. These findings underline the strong ideological alignment of socio-cultural professionals and its transmission to their offspring. However, as they start working under a different work logic, they become influenced by their new environment and re-socialized into the new work logic. This is in line with the work of Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) stressing the importance of the work logic for the differentiation in political orientations, especially among the middle class.

# 6 Conclusion

In contrast with previous studies regarding the political consequences of social mobility, this study takes the political ideology of both the parent and their offspring into consideration. As such, this study has investigated the question how vertical and horizontal intergenerational social mobility of children affects the *transmission* of political ideology from parents to children. The main conclusion is that vertical mobility is most consequential in impeding the intergenerational transmission process, compared to horizontal mobility. However, no change in offspring's ideology is observed after experiencing vertical mobility, pointing at a self-selection mechanism. I further elaborate on the findings in the remainder of this section.

Based on the results, I firstly conclude that socially mobile individuals are indeed different from their immobile peers. Individuals who have experienced social mobility, differ in ideology from their immobile peers: the upwardly mobile show more leftist positions, while the downwardly mobile in Switzerland are found to the right of the immobile. Horizontal mobility also implies having distinct positions from the immobile. The findings indicate that vertically socially mobile individuals are less close to the political ideology of their father, in line with expectations. The fact that both downward and upward social mobility indicate a larger ideological distance to the father in Germany, compared to only upward mobility in Switzerland, may signify that vertical differences are more important for ideological differentiation across classes in Germany.

These findings raise the question whether differences between socially mobile and immobile citizens are due to the actual experience of social mobility, or to the fact that those who became mobile were different from the outset. Longitudinal fixed effects analyses indicate that previous findings are indeed due to self-selection into social mobility, as most respondents did not change their political ideology after experiencing social mobility. However, it should be noted that the use of left-right positions as a summary measure of political ideology may result in lower-bound estimates here, and perhaps a change would be observed in individuals' positions on specific policy issues. An alternative explanation could be that the process of adaptation is more incremental, and is therefore not observed in these analyses that estimate a change in ideology after becoming socially mobile. This also relates to education as a vehicle for social mobility. As upward mobility is often a consequence of a higher level of education than the parents, perhaps processes of re-socialization already occur over the course of the study and therefore no direct change is observed after arrival in the class of destination. However, choice of study is already part of a self-selection mechanism, and therefore one cannot disentangle these processes. Therefore, the conclusions of this study may cast doubt on earlier findings regarding the consequences of social mobility for political preferences, as the results here do not indicate causal effects of vertical social mobility.

Findings are different for horizontally mobile offspring of fathers in the interpersonal logic, and reveal a complex interplay of the ideology of parents and children and how it relates to offspring's social mobility. While the cross-sectional results for the middle class imply a smaller difference to the parental ideology compared to the immobile, the FE analyses also show that this group does move away from the parental ideology as a consequence of horizontal mobility. These findings point at an enduring socialization in the class of origin, and at the same time the re-socializing power of the class of destination with a different work logic. Additional research is needed to further disentangle the processes that underlie the leverage of the work logic for political ideology. Although these findings are limited to one type of horizontal mobility, this study provides a first step into showing the importance of the father's work logic combined with the consequences of moving towards a different field than the father.

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# Appendix

Table A1Percentages of respondents by own left-right self-placement<br/>and their father's left-right position (retrospectively provided by<br/>respondent), Switzerland

Father's	Respondent's left-right self-placement T						Total					
left-right position	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
0	26.5	12.1	7.3	7.6	5.3	4.9	3.0	1.5	3.0	4.2	5.1	5.8
1	3.8	9.9	2.4	1.3	1.5	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.0	1.5	1.1
2	8.7	7.7	14.3	7.5	5.4	4.1	3.2	2.3	2.0	2.1	0.0	4.9
3	7.3	15.4	10.5	11.7	8.6	7.0	4.6	5.4	4.8	1.0	1.5	7.2
4	11.3	12.1	10.9	12.0	11.4	6.8	7.5	5.9	2.7	4.2	2.9	8.0
5	18.0	12.1	22.4	20.3	23.6	35.5	21.1	22.7	18.2	16.7	18.6	25.4
6	3.2	4.4	6.0	10.1	12.0	8.0	16.5	11.9	10.2	8.3	4.7	9.8
7	4.7	7.7	10.0	14.7	17.0	13.5	21.5	23.6	16.4	16.7	10.6	15.5
8	7.9	14.3	7.5	9.5	10.7	11.7	14.3	18.0	26.0	22.9	19.3	13.3
9	1.5	2.2	3.2	2.3	1.7	1.9	2.6	3.2	5.5	10.4	4.4	2.6
10	7.3	2.2	5.6	3.0	2.9	6.0	5.5	5.0	10.9	13.5	31.6	6.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: SHP 1999–2017. N = 7,685.

Table A2	OLS regressions of child's ideology on father's ideology and social
	mobility (full models, table 4)

Left-right self-placement	Switz	erland	Germany		
5	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	
Father's L/R ideology	0.248***	0.246***	0.211***	0.211***	
	(0.0113)	(0.0113)	(0.0521)	(0.0513)	
Vertical Mobility (ref = no mobility)					
Downward		0.215**		-0.0942	
		(0.0870)		(0.242)	
Upward		-0.330***		-0.320*	
		(0.0646)		(0.177)	
Horizontal Mobility (ref = no mobility)					
Move from Entrepreneurial		-0.321***		-0.714	
·		(0.111)		(0.724)	
Move from Organizational		-0.476***		0.0365	
5		(0.0932)		(0.268)	
Move from Technical		0.112		0.345**	
		(0.0936)		(0.174)	
Move from Interpersonal		0.299**		0.231	
		(0.133)		(0.348)	
Father's class location		. ,		. ,	
(ref = Large empl. andSelf-empl. prof.)					
Small business owners	-0.0774	0.198	0.709	1.166	
	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.585)	(0.752)	
Technical (semi-)professionals	-0.220	-0.533***	0.0253	-0.519	
	(0.135)	(0.175)	(0.437)	(0.438)	
Production workers	-0.226*	-0.271	0.276	-0.132	
	(0.121)	(0.171)	(0.416)	(0.439)	
(Associate) managers	-0.161	-0.0971	0.463	0.117	
	(0.125)	(0.159)	(0.422)	(0.457)	
Clerks	-0.301**	0.0438	0.390	0.179	
	(0.142)	(0.183)	(0.457)	(0.515)	
Socio-cultural (semi-)prof.	-0.539***	-0.931***	-0.278	-0.755	
	(0.140)	(0.171)	(0.497)	(0.568)	
Service workers	-0.0813	-0.254	0.519	0.128	
	(0.156)	(0.212)	(0.456)	(0.526)	
Civil status (ref = married)					
Divorced/separated	-0.232***	-0.236***	0.235	0.195	
·	(0.0739)	(0.0738)	(0.240)	(0.245)	
Other	-0.228***	-0.223***	-0.0717	-0.0845	
	(0.0618)	(0.0617)	(0.136)	(0.135)	

Continuation of table A2 on the following page.

Left-right self-placement	Switze	rland	Germ	Germany		
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)		
Level of education (ref = medium)						
Low	0.110	0.0758	-0.168	-0.165		
	(0.0907)	(0.0907)	(0.216)	(0.217)		
High	-0.477***	-0.373***	-0.195	-0.145		
	(0.0528)	(0.0557)	(0.227)	(0.238)		
Female	-0.623***	-0.628***	-0.502***	-0.551***		
	(0.0436)	(0.0455)	(0.122)	(0.129)		
Age	0.00745***	0.00724***	-1.85e-05	-0.00255		
	(0.00180)	(0.00180)	(0.0134)	(0.0136)		
Location in 1989 (ref = East DE)						
West DE			0.0285	0.0435		
			(0.143)	(0.144)		
Abroad			-0.682	-0.681		
			(0.513)	(0.533)		
Year of interview dummies	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				
Constant	5.245***	5.235***	4.856***	5.292***		
	(0.705)	(0.646)	(0.649)	(0.691)		
Observations	7685	7685	770	770		
R-squared	0.135	0.143	0.088	0.099		

Continuation of table A2.

Source: SHP 1999–2017. N = 7,685.

		Switzerland			Germany	
Lett fight sen placement	(3)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(3)	( '/	MC origin	(5)	( ')	MC origin
Father's L/R ideology	0.266***	0.245***	0.255***	0.331***	0.198**	0.231
5	(0.0146)	(0.0206)	(0.0295)	(0.0599)	(0.0897)	(0.157)
Vertical Mobility (ref=no mobility)						
Downward	0.215**	0.215**	0.226**	-0.120	-0.0644	0.0430
	(0.0872)	(0.0868)	(0.0936)	(0.239)	(0.246)	(0.263)
Upward	-0.334***	-0.330***		-0.298*	-0.334*	
	(0.0646)	(0.0647)		(0.176)	(0.177)	
Downward Mobility*Father's L/R	-0.0146			-0.308**		
	(0.0366)			(0.134)		
Upward Mobility*Father's L/R	-0.0606**			-0.286***		
. ,	(0.0243)			(0.0989)		
Horizontal Mobility						
(ref = no mobility)						
Move from Entrepreneurial	-0.311***	-0.318***	-0.0752	-0.730	-0.461	0.0185
	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.148)	(0.752)	(0.622)	(0.559)
Move from Organizational	-0.475***	-0.471***	-0.297***	0.0701	0.0332	0.174
	(0.0932)	(0.0930)	(0.0945)	(0.257)	(0.267)	(0.244)
Move from Technical	0.107	0.119	-0.162	0.305*	0.343**	0.00432
	(0.0935)	(0.0951)	(0.105)	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.282)
Move from Interpersonal	0.286**	0.318**	-0.277**	0.177	0.155	-0.233
	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.138)	(0.342)	(0.342)	(0.326)
Move from Entrepr.*Father's L/R		-0.00366	0.0549		-0.288	-0.896*
		(0.0343)	(0.0723)		(0.266)	(0.471)
Move from Organiz.*Father's L/R		-0.0405	-0.0528		0.0344	0.0103
		(0.0370)	(0.0468)		(0.139)	(0.203)
Move from Techn.*Father's L/R		0.0123	0.0133		-0.000884	0.0214
		(0.0284)	(0.0484)		(0.115)	(0.213)
Move from Interp.*Father's L/R		0.0515	0.0994*		0.261	0.220
		(0.0443)	(0.0586)		(0.165)	(0.207)
Father's class location						
(ref = Large empl. And Self-empl. prof.)						
Small business owners	0.219*	0.199		1.165	1.380*	
	(0.130)	(0.130)		(0.807)	(0.746)	
Technical (semi-)professionals	-0.506***	-0.538***		-0.512	-0.478	
	(0.176)	(0.177)		(0 474)	(0 447)	

# Table A3OLS interaction models: child's ideology on social mobility ×<br/>father's ideology

Continuation of table A3 on the following page.

Left-right self-placement	Switzerland			German	ý	
	(3)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			MC origin			MC origin
Production workers	-0.254	-0.273		-0.142	-0.0716	
	(0.171)	(0.173)		(0.480)	(0.451)	
(Associate) managers	-0.0844	-0.0933		0.0657	0.168	
	(0.159)	(0.159)		(0.484)	(0.469)	
Clerks	0.0597	0.0325		0.142	0.240	
	(0.183)	(0.184)		(0.545)	(0.525)	
Socio-cultural (semi-)prof.	-0.895***	-0.933***		-0.752	-0.681	
	(0.172)	(0.174)		(0.590)	(0.580)	
Service workers	-0.224	-0.256		0.145	0.161	
	(0.212)	(0.213)		(0.555)	(0.537)	
Civil status (ref=married)						
Divorced/separated	-0.231***	-0.235***	-0.212*	0.230	0.216	0.115
	(0.0737)	(0.0739)	(0.117)	(0.247)	(0.241)	(0.294)
Other	-0.221***	-0.221***	-0.222**	-0.0691	-0.0727	-0.204
	(0.0617)	(0.0617)	(0.0922)	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.213)
Level of education (ref=medium)						
Low	0.0752	0.0743	-0.167	-0.175	-0.180	0.245
	(0.0907)	(0.0909)	(0.207)	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.666)
High	-0.374***	-0.373***	-0.492***	-0.149	-0.156	0.373
	(0.0557)	(0.0557)	(0.0970)	(0.236)	(0.239)	(0.668)
Female	-0.624***	-0.627***	-0.732***	-0.543***	-0.543***	-0.150
	(0.0456)	(0.0455)	(0.0740)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.207)
Age	0.00708***	0.00728***	0.0111***	-0.00488	-0.00379	-0.00213
	(0.00180)	(0.00181)	(0.00287)	(0.0134)	(0.0135)	(0.0208)
Location in 1989 (ref=East DE)						
West DE				0.0639	0.0524	0.167
				(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.236)
Abroad				-0.696	-0.681	0.650
				(0.535)	(0.537)	(0.402)
Year of interview dummies	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$			
Constant	5.207***	5.271***	6.103***	5.389***	5.280***	4.431***
	(0.663)	(0.615)	(0.226)	(0.704)	(0.705)	(1.053)
Observations	7,685	7,685	2,842	770	770	306
R-squared	0.144	0.144	0.161	0.121	0.106	0.114

Continuation of table A3.

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009; SHP 1999–2017. SEs in parentheses, clustered at the household. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

# Table A4Individual fixed effects analysis: left-right Ideology on<br/>intergenerational social mobility, Switzerland (table 5,<br/>including extra models 3–5)

Left–right self-placement	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			WC origin	MC origin	
Vertical Mobility					
(ref=no mobility)					
No class location yet	0.000709				0.0373
	(0.0354)				(0.0394)
Downward	-0.0194				-0.0303
	(0.0406)				(0.0410)
Upward	-0.00305				-0.00393
	(0.0299)				(0.0301)
Horizontal Mobility					
(ref= no mobility)					
No class location yet		0.0404	0.0706	0.0164	-
		(0.0385)	(0.0556)	(0.0521)	
Move from Entrepreneurial		-0.0266	-0.0185	-0.0297	-0.0270
		(0.0431)	(0.0506)	(0.0917)	(0.0433)
Move from Organizational		0.0258	0.127	-0.0152	0.0295
		(0.0448)	(0.0891)	(0.0492)	(0.0451)
Move from Technical		0.0657	0.0519	0.115	0.0655
		(0.0409)	(0.0501)	(0.0731)	(0.0410)
Move from Interpersonal		0.190***	0.283**	0.136*	0.194***
		(0.0647)	(0.114)	(0.0750)	(0.0649)
Age in year of interview	0.0177***	0.0177***	0.0173***	0.0185***	0.0177***
	(0.00109)	(0.00109)	(0.00144)	(0.00164)	(0.00109)
Constant	3.915***	3.880***	3.959***	3.752***	3.883***
	(0.0574)	(0.0594)	(0.0813)	(0.0851)	(0.0603)
N person-years	62,591	62,591	37,947	24,644	62,591
N individuals	8,820	8,820	5,371	3,449	8,820
R-squared	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.005

Source: SHP 1999–2017. SEs in parentheses. \*\*\*p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1